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COMMENTS
FAIR TO WHOM? MISAPPLICATION OF THE FAIR
RESPONSIBILITY ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are waiting to cross the street at a marked crosswalk. The
light turns green and you step into the street just as a driver runs the red light
from the other direction and hits you. It seems clear that this driver was bla-
tantly negligent and everyone agrees that you have the right to sue the driver
for every penny spent on medical expenses and the damages associated with
the pain and suffering of being permanently disabled. But what if that driver
has no money?
In the course of investigating your claim, your attorney discovers that, at
the time of the accident, the bulb in one of the red lights facing the driver
was burned out (assume there was one signal overhead and another to the
left of the intersection facing the driver). Your attorney names the city as a
defendant in the lawsuit on the theory that it negligently maintained the in-
tersection signal. Since the driver was unable to pay your damages, the city
stands to bear the total cost based on the well-established common law prin-
ciple of joint and several liability, which holds every defendant liable for the
entire damage award.
This scenario raises several issues. On the one hand, joint and several li-
ability is vital to ensuring that people injured through no fault of their own
recover all of their damages from the parties at fault. On the other hand, it
seems unfair that the city winds up paying more than its proportionate share
of the damages merely because it has more money. In California, insurance
companies that wanted to reduce claims and litigation costs began campaign-
ing for reform of the joint and several liability system.' In 1986, their efforts
to stir up dissension resulted in the question being put before California vot-
ers in the form of a proposition.2
1. Ellyn Moscowitz, The Fair Responsibility Act of 1986: How Fair Is It?, 13 WHITrIER
L. REv. 909, 909 (1992).
2. Proposition 51, "The Fair Responsibility Act" (June 3, 1986) (codified as CAL. CIv.
CODE § 1431.1-1431.5 (West 1986)).
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Proposition 51 specifically stated that its intent was to protect these
"deep pocket defendants."3 While joint and several liability would be re-
tained for economic damages, principles of comparative fault would be ap-
plied to non-economic damages.4 Namely, each defendant would only be li-
able for its percentage of the general damages, with a jury deciding these
percentages.5 Following a hard-fought campaign in which the insurance in-
dustry spent millions on television advertising, the voters approved this con-
tentious initiative.6
An unanticipated result of this proposition, which will be the focus of
this Comment, is that many California courts have interpreted this statute to
mean that juries may calculate a percentage of fault for a named defendant
even when there are no other named parties with fault to compare.7 This
means that, though neither names nor evidence of fault of any other party
besides the defendant is offered at trial, an instruction that provides for attri-
bution of fault to "all other persons" is allowed.' Because of this, the basis
for the jury's apportionment becomes highly questionable. Moreover, the re-
sult is that an injured plaintiff may be denied a full recovery without a show-
ing that anyone besides the named defendant is at fault.
Part II of this Comment will explain the background and policies behind
joint and several liability, Proposition 51, the related California jury instruc-
tions, and immunity statutes. Part III will argue that names and evidence of
fault sufficient to prove the elements of the applicable tort must be presented
at trial before a Proposition 51 apportionment may be made. The current sys-
tem of attributing fault to an unknown, unnamed person seems to violate the
very principles of law. Part IV will discuss the special problems that arise
with application of the Part II rule to immune entities and will provide a
suggestion as to how they should be resolved.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Joint and Several Liability
Joint and several liability is the long-employed common law principle
that where there are multiple tortfeasors, each will be held indivisibly liable
for the total damages.9 The rationale behind this is that "if [the] defendants
3. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.1 (West 1986).
4. See id. § 1431.2
5. See id.
6. See Kenneth Reich, Deep Pockets' Controversy Prop. 51 Ads, Pro and Con-Is Voter
Being Misled, L.A. TIMEs, May 26, 1986, at BI; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West
1986).
7. See discussion infra section Ii.
8. See California Jury Instructions, Civil § 16.00 (9th ed. 2002); see also California Jury
Instructions, Civil § 16.73 (9th ed. 2002).
9. 14 CAL. JUR. 3D CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNIFICATION § 77 (1999).
[Vol. 39
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are independent tort feasors and thus each liable for the damage caused by
him alone, and, at least, where the matter of apportionment is incapable of
proof, the innocent wronged party should not be deprived of his right to re-
dress."'" The idea, that the fault should be borne by a negligent tortfeasor
rather than an innocent plaintiff, even if that defendant is only one of the
causes of the harm, has been a firmly entrenched aspect of tort law for dec-
ades.1
This compensation scheme also serves the very important function of
protecting plaintiffs when one or more of the tortfeasors is indigent. In this
scenario, without joint and several liability, the plaintiff might be denied a
full recovery, despite having included all negligent parties in the lawsuit.1 2
As one court stated, "we think that ... abandonment of the joint and several
liability rule would work a serious and unwarranted deleterious effect on the
practical ability of negligently injured persons to receive adequate compen-
sation for their injuries."13
B. Proposition 51
In 1986, California voters enacted Proposition 51 in an effort to ensure
that civil judgments more accurately corresponded with the degree of fault of
the defendant. 4 In recent years, concern arose that plaintiffs were targeting
government agencies and corporations with good insurance coverage for
large damages suits. 5 The rationale cited for this behavior was that the doc-
trine of joint and several liability ensured recovery from any defendant
shown to share some portion of the fault of the injury.' 6 In some cases, this
meant that the defendant with a small percentage of fault, but a large bank
10. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1948).
11. See Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 218 P.2d 17, 32 (Cal. 1950) ("Even though per-
sons are not acting in concert, if the result[s] produced by their acts are indivisible, each per-
son is held liable for the whole.... The reason for imposing liability on each for the entire
consequence is that there exists no basis for dividing damages and the law is loath to permit
an innocent plaintiff to suffer as against a wrongdoing defendant. This liability is imposed
where each cause is sufficient in itself as well as where each cause is required to produce the
result.").
12. In rejecting the replacement of joint and several liability with a comparative negli-
gence scheme, the California Supreme Court has noted:
[I]n many instances a plaintiff will be completely free of all responsibility for the
accident, and yet, under the proposed abolition of joint and several liability, such a
completely faultless plaintiff, rather than a wrongdoing defendant, would be forced
to bear a portion of the loss if any one of the concurrent tortfeasors should prove
financially unable to satisfy his proportioned share of the damages.
American Motorcycle Ass'n. v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 905 (Cal. 1978).
13. Id. at 906 (emphasis added).
14. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1431.1-1431.5 (West 1986).
15. See John W. Wade, Should Joint and Several Liability of Multiple Tortfeasors be
Abolished? 10 AM. J. TRIALADVOC. 193, 193 (1986).
16. Id. at 194.
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account, was held liable for the full amount of damages sought.'7 Though
joint and several liability served the purpose of ensuring recovery by the
plaintiff, it was viewed as an unfair burden on these defendants.' 8
One author has suggested that the primary impetus for the passage of
Proposition 51 was a tremendous effort by the insurance industry to portray
their rising expenses as a "crisis."' 9 This effort was apparently successful, as
reflected in the preamble language of the Initiative (section 1431.1):
The People of the State of California find and declare as follows:
(a) The legal doctrine of joint and several liability, also known as "the
deep pocket rule," has resulted in a system of inequity and injustice that
has threatened financial bankruptcy of local governments, other public
agencies, private individuals and businesses and has resulted in higher
prices for goods and services to the public and in higher taxes to the tax-
payers.
(b) Some governmental and private defendants are perceived to have sub-
stantial financial resources or insurance coverage and have thus been in-
cluded in lawsuits even though there was little or no basis for finding them
at fault. Under joint and several liability, if they are found to share even a
fraction of the fault, they often are held financially liable for all the dam-
age. The People-taxpayers and consumers alike-ultimately pay for
these lawsuits in the form of higher taxes, higher prices and higher insur-
ance premiums.
(c) Local governments have been forced to curtail some essential police,
fire and other protections because of the soaring costs of lawsuits and in-
surance premiums.
Therefore, the People of the State of California declare that to remedy
these inequities, defendants in tort actions shall be held financially liable
in closer proportion to their degree of fault. To treat them differently is un-
fair and inequitable.
The People of the State of California further declare that reforms in the li-
ability laws in tort actions are necessary and proper to avoid catastrophic
economic consequences for state and local governmental bodies as well as
private individuals and businesses.
20
It is important to note that Proposition 51 applies only to non-economic
damages.2' By the terms of the statute, these are defined as "subjective, non-
monetary losses including, but not limited to, pain, suffering, inconvenience,
mental suffering, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, loss
of consortium, injury to reputation and humiliation. 22 These are the same
types of losses generally referred to in the law as "general damages." Eco-
nomic damages, generally called special damages, remain the joint and sev-
17. See Proposition 51, "The Fair Responsibility Act" (June 3, 1986), reprinted in Evan-
gelatos v. Superior Court, 753 P.2d 585, app. at 614 (1988) (Argument in Favor of Proposi-
tion 51).
18. See id.
19. James A. Gash, Rethinking Principles of Comparative Fault in Light of California's
Proposition 51, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1495, 1543 n.6 (1992).
20. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1431.1 (West 1986).
21. Id. § 1431.2.
22. See id.
[Vol. 39
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eral liability of all defendants to the litigation.23 Examples of economic dam-
ages are identified in the statute as "objectively verifiable monetary losses
including medical expenses, loss of earnings, burial costs, loss of use of
property, costs of repair or replacement, costs of obtaining substitute domes-
tic services, loss of employment and loss of business or employment oppor-
tunities." 24
Proposition 51 thus apportions damages between defendants according
to what kind of recovery is sought. The substantive language of the initiative
is as follows:
In any action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death,
based upon principles of comparative fault, the liability of each defendant
for non-economic damages shall be several only and shall not be joint.
Each defendant shall be liable only for the amount of non-economic dam-
ages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's
percentage of fault, and a separate judgment shall be rendered against that
defendant for that amount.25
Opponents of Proposition 51 argue that it removes the protections for
injured plaintiffs who previously were protected by joint and several liabil-
ity.26 The essence of joint and several liability was that recovery by innocent,
injured plaintiffs was of paramount concern and should be ensured. 27 This
initiative opens the way for plaintiffs to be denied full recovery in several
ways. One or more of the liable defendants may be insolvent, missing, un-
known, or immune. In these cases, the plaintiff cannot include the party in
the initial lawsuit at all or it would be futile to do so. Furthermore, even if
some percentage of fault were apportioned to one of these parties, the plain-
tiff would never be able to actually collect on the judgment. Thus, plaintiff is
left in exactly the same uncompensated, helpless position that the architects
of joint and several liability sought to prevent.
C. California Jury Instructions
Because Proposition 51 allows each defendant to be held liable only for
his own percentage of fault, it logically follows that calculation of this per-
centage "necessarily requires independently acting tortfeasors who have
some fault to compare."2 However, for many reasons, the plaintiff may not
23. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 753 P.2d 585, 590 (Cal. 1988).
24. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West 1986).
25. Id.
26. See Proposition 51, "The Fair Responsibility Act" (June 3, 1986), reprinted in Evan-
gelatos, 753 P.2d at app. 615 (Argument Against Proposition 51).
27. "Joint and several liability ensure that even if at least one joint tort-feasor is insolvent
or judgment-proof, the injured party may still recover the full amount of the judgment from
each of the remaining tort-feasors." 86 C.J.S. TORTS § 40 (1997).
28. Rashtian v. BRAC-BH, Inc., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411,414 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
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have made all possible tortfeasors a party to the suit.29 As such, a modified
version of California jury instruction 16.00 from the Book of Approved Jury
Instructions ("BAJI") is frequently used in litigation. This instruction allows
the jury to ascribe percentages of fault to the defendants, the plaintiff, and a
general category of all "other persons. 30 The question this raises, which will
be a focus of the discussion of this Comment, is: must these "other persons"
be named, and sufficient evidence of their fault presented at trial, before a
percentage of fault may be apportioned to them at trial to offset the liability
of the named defendants? It would seem intuitively unfair to deny a plaintiff
a full recovery because fault was apportioned to unknown parties. To further
allow it to be done without any showing of proof requires the jury to decide
based on a whim and the superior court "is not a place of mysticism or con-
juring."'" However, there is some precedent for courts using this instruction
in the absence of evidence of the fault of these non-party tortfeasors.32
D. Immune Entities
One subset of individuals who have served as a basis for raising the is-
sues of how and when fault may be apportioned is immune entities. Immu-
nity statutes protect certain types of persons and entities from liability in
tort.33 This generally serves the purpose of either encouraging socially desir-
able behaviors (such as helping in an emergency without fear of a lawsuit) or
protecting the financial integrity of vital institutions (such as schools). These
29. For example, if the tortfeasor is unknown, such as a hit-and-run driver, then he or she
may also be outside of the jurisdiction and not subject to service, immune, or insolvent (and
therefore, perhaps not worth suing).
30. California Jury Instructions, Civil § 16.00 (9th ed. 2002) (Question six asks, "Assum-
ing that 100% represents the total negligence [and fault] [and wrongful conduct] that was the
cause of the plaintiffs [injury] [damage]. What percentage of this 100% is due to the con-
tributory negligence of the plaintiff and what percentage of this 100% is due to the [negli-
gence] [and] [fault] [and] [wrongful conduct] of the defendant[s] [and all other persons]?").
31. Pl.'s Reply in Support of Proposed J. at 6, Castillo v. San Diego Transit Corp. (San
Diego Super. Ct. 2001) (No. 728790).
32. See, e.g., Bly-Magee v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 330, 333 (Cal. Ct.
App.) (1994). (Special verdict form allowing allocation of fault to "other persons" was used
and the jury returned a verdict attributing 5% of fault to plaintiff, 90% to defendant, and 0%
to "other persons." Defendant objected to use of the "other persons" designation, but the court
affirmed the holding on appeal. The court stated that sufficient evidence of other possible
third party tortfeasors was present in the record and "Budget had every opportunity to focus
the jury on this issue but chose not to do so.") Id. at 335.
33. See, e.g. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45 (West 1998) (providing immunity from products
liability suits for manufacturers of consumer products known by consumers to be inherently
unsafe); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44808 (West 1993) (providing immunity for schools for injuries
to students incurred off-campus); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2395 (West 1990) (grants im-
munity to licensed medical professionals for civil damages incurred while providing medical
care at the scene of an emergency).
[Vol. 39
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statutes typically provide that the institution is presumed immune unless any
of a set of listed exceptions applies.
34
While the courts have made it clear that immunity statutes protect cer-
tain parties from being apportioned any percentage of fault when they are
named as primary parties to a lawsuit, the courts have wavered on the proper
course where the immune entity is not a party to the suit.35 However, in the
most recent California Supreme Court decision on this issue, involving a to-
bacco manufacturer, the court concluded that a third party could not be as-
signed a portion of fault by way of Proposition 51 if it would have been im-
mune from any liability if named as a party. 36 Despite this seemingly clear
statement of logic, the holding of this case has not been uniformly fol-
lowed.37
III. ANALYSIS
California voters likely never anticipated the broad range of situations in
which Proposition 51 is now being applied. If they had, these citizens never
would have approved the measure.
As one commentator noted:
Now the question must be asked: Is the "Fair Responsibility Act" really
fair? For the most part, the answer to that question depends on who one
asks. For the insurance industry, which created and promoted the initia-
tive, the initiative has been more than fair. Recent court decisions have
gone beyond what the initiative originally contemplated. For injured per-
sons, the initiative has been anything but "fair," resulting in substantially
reduced recoveries. 38
The voters, in an effort to do what was fair, probably never considered
that injured people would be left unable to recover all of their damages. The
logical assumption is that the damages will be divvied up among the defen-
dants who are parties to the trial. Thus, once everyone pays his or her fair
share, the plaintiff receives full compensation and no one is subject to an un-
fair burden. The voters likely did not consider defendants with no money or
assets, were not aware of immunity statutes, and did not conceive that un-
34. See, e.g. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45 (West 1998); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44808 (West
1993); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2395 (West 1990).
35. See, e.g., discussion infra section IV.
36. Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 928 P.2d 1181, 1191 (Cal. 1997).
37. See, e.g., Arena v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998) (relying upon DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140, 141 (1992) (holding "the
plain language of section 1431.2 eliminates a third party defendant's joint and several liability
to an injured employee for unpaid noneconomic damages attributable to the fault of the em-
ployer, who is statutorily immune from suit."). Id.
38. Ellyn Moscowitz, The Fair Responsibility Act of 1986: How Fair Is It?, 13 WHITTIER
L. REv. 909, 909-10 (1992).
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named parties might be apportioned part of the fault. These additions have
come as the special finishing touches of the courts.
The clearest and most shocking example of Proposition 51 being
stretched to applications far beyond its intended use arose out of an automo-
bile accident-related lawsuit. In apportioning fault amongst the various par-
ties, the jury attributed ten percent of the fault to a squirrel!" Apparently the
squirrel chose an inopportune moment to run out into the road.4" As a result,
the court effectively denied the plaintiff ten percent of the expected recov-
ery.41 Clearly, the plaintiff had no chance of enforcing judgment against the
squirrel, and the voters of California would likely be horrified to hear that
this Act had been expanded to cover such an allocation.
A. Must Third Parties be Named Before a Percentage of Culpability
May be Ascribed to Them?
The application of modified special verdict BAJI instructions 16.00 and
16.73 to Proposition 51 apportionments would suggest that the jury need not
name the third parties to whom it may attribute some percentage of the fault.
This is because the last question of the instruction asks the jury what per-
centage of fault is attributable to "all other persons" besides the defendant(s)
and plaintiff(s).42 The instructions do not specify that the jury receive a list
of candidates who constitute a class of "other persons," nor do they specifi-
cally define who may not be considered a candidate.4 3 Thus, facially, the in-
structions pave the way for the jury to consider just about anyone it wants to
blame.
In one fairly recent case, Bly-Magee v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corporation,
the court upheld the use of this instruction." Here, plaintiff rented a car from
Budget and was subsequently stopped by a California Highway Patrol offi-
cer because the car's license plates had expired.4" When the driver also could
not produce the car's registration or her proof of insurance, the officer cited
her for driving with an expired registration and failure to produce the same
upon request. 46 The driver subsequently refused to sign the citation and was
39. James A. Gash, Rethinking Principles of Comparative Fault in Light of California's
Proposition 51, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1495, 1543 n.338 (1992) (citing Sandra Calin, Multiple
Tortfeasors: Proposition 51, the "Fair Responsibility Act of 1986," 21 BEVERLY HILLS BAR.
J. 26, 29 (Winter 1987)).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See California Jury Instructions, Civil § 16.00 (9th ed. 2002); see also California Jury
Instructions, Civil § 16.73 (9th ed. 2002).
43. See California Jury Instructions, Civil § 16.00 (9th ed. 2002); see also California Jury
Instructions, Civil § 16.73 (9th ed. 2002)..
44. Bly-Magee v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 330, 335 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994).
45. id. at 331.
46. Id.
[Vol. 39
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taken to the courthouse.47 A magistrate was unavailable, so the police incar-
cerated the driver and allegedly subjected her to verbal and physical abuse. 8
Upon her release seven hours later, the plaintiff sued Budget and the local
branch from which she had rented the vehicle.49
At the conclusion of the trial, Budget requested a special verdict form
that named three non-party deputy sheriffs as possible parties to whom fault
could be assigned.5" The court rejected this request and instead used a form
with the "other persons" designation.51 When the jury did not allocate any of
the fault to "other persons," Budget appealed on the grounds that this lan-
guage confused the jurors and amounted to reversible error.52 In holding that
the instruction did not mislead the jury, the appellate court noted that
"[g]iven that the evidence included expansive references to the conduct of
the CHP and the Sheriffs Department, including the complaints in the other
cases filed by Bly-Magee against these law enforcement agencies arising out
of this same incident, Budget had every opportunity to focus the jury on this
issue but chose not to do so." 53
It is important to note in this case that while the names of the nonparties
were not specifically used on the form, they were referenced by name fre-
quently throughout the course of the trial. Thus, as the court noted, the jury
should have had a clear idea to whom the "other persons" designation re-
ferred.54 Further, the parties to the trial had the opportunity to focus the
jury's attention on these individuals and their culpability.
Distinguishable from the Bly-Magee scenario are cases where the non-
parties are never mentioned during the course of the trial, but the instruction
is still allowed. In an unpublished case, currently on appeal in a California
appellate court, the trial court explicitly excluded all evidence as to the con-
tributory negligence of the plaintiff's mother in a personal injury suit.55
However, at the conclusion of the trial, the judge independently asked the
jury what percentage of fault could be attributed to "all others" besides the
plaintiff and the sole defendant (who was not the mother).56 The jury re-
turned a verdict finding that 50.1 percent of the fault was attributable to
these "other persons. 57
47. Id.
48. Id. at 332.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 334.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 335 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 334-35.
55. J. On Special Verdict, Castillo v. San Diego Transit Corp. (San Diego Super. Ct.
2001) (No. 728790).
56. Id. at 2.
57. ld.
9
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The mother was not a named defendant at trial and her name was not
mentioned at the verdict stage, but the jury apparently attributed some de-
gree of fault to her.58 And, while the jury, in conjecturing as to whom this
instruction referred, likely primarily considered the mother, it may have con-
sidered any number of other people or entities. 59 In addition to the disagree-
able imprecision of this method, it seems inappropriate for the jury to have
been allowed to consider her participation in making its determination, given
that the court explicitly excluded all evidence related to the mother. In per-
mitting the use of this instruction, the court essentially allowed the mother to
be reintroduced as a defendant through the backdoor. It will be interesting to
see if the seeming impropriety of this method results in a reversal at the ap-
pellate level.
B. Is Evidence Sufficient to Prove a Prima Facie Case of Negligence by
These Third Parties Required?
Assuming that the non-parties who might share liability are named, the
next question is how much evidence of their culpability, if any, must be ad-
mitted before they can be apportioned a percentage of the damages. It would
seem intuitive that a prima facie showing of negligence must be offered be-
fore liability can be assessed. After all, if these third parties were actual,
named defendants, they would likely succeed in obtaining a demurrer if the
plaintiff did not plead sufficient evidence of negligence.6" Furthermore, the
jury should have some reasonable basis for allocating fault to these parties.
The charge of jurors is to weigh the evidence in light of the applicable law.6
Without evidence, it would seem that their function would change funda-
mentally, resulting in verdicts based on intuition, conjecture and whim.62
Seemingly all of the published cases involving a dispute over a Proposi-
tion 51 apportionment included at least some admissible evidence as to the
responsibility of non-parties. However, this evidence may not, in all cases,
have actually been tantamount to a prima facie showing. The first question
then is whether evidence of fault is required at all.
Logic suggests that there must be evidence of fault. Damages are paid
based upon a finding that the defendant is liable for a tort. Liability for a tort
58. Compl. For Damages at 1, Castillo v. San Diego Transit Corp. (San Diego Super. Ct.
1999) (No. 728790).
59. There was also an immune entity involved in the incident, but this raises issues to be
discussed later in the Comment. Evidence was explicitly excluded as to this entity as well.
60. CAL. CIv. PROC. § 430.10 (West 1973) (permitting a demurrer where facts are insuf-
ficient to state a cause of action).
61. See 50A C.J.S. JURIES § 2 (1997) ("A jury is a body of persons sworn to declare the
facts of a case as they are proven from the evidence placed before them."); see also id. § 3
("The term 'jury'. . . refers to a jury which is called to try the questions in an issue and to pass
finally on the proof of such facts.").
62. See Pl.'s Reply in Support of Proposed J. at 6, Castillo v. San Diego Transit Corp.,
(San Diego Super. Ct. 2001) (No. 728790).
[Vol. 39
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is premised upon a showing of some form of wrongdoing. The only accept-
able method under American standards of law to show that a wrong was ac-
tually committed, and that the defendant was the actual and proximate cause
of the harm, is to offer material, admissible evidence. Thus, a party may not
be assessed damages unless sufficient evidentiary proof is offered to over-
come the relevant standard (preponderance of the evidence, clear and con-
vincing, etc). Therefore, it follows that (a) any party figured into the equa-
tion for purposes of determining percentages of liability under Proposition
51 must have committed a tort, and (b) in order to prove this, evidence of
that party's fault must be admitted.
This is why the courts have not allowed a percentage of fault to be ap-
portioned to vicariously liable employers.63 These employers have commit-
ted no tort in and of themselves. Their involvement is strictly by way of re-
sponsibility for the employee tortfeasor. Therefore, any evidence offered
could only be to prove that the employee was a cause of the harm. Since a
percentage of fault based on this evidence has already been allocated to the
employee (for which the employer is vicariously liable), applying an addi-
tional equal share to the employer would be duplicative. It would have no
independent evidentiary foundation.
Given that, on at least some level, the courts have verified the logic that
liability cannot be allotted without evidence of fault, the next question is
how much evidence is required. Not all entities to whom liability has been
attributed have been parties to the suit. In dealing with this, the courts have
seemingly undergone a somewhat indirect, haphazard evaluation of whether
the elements of the tort have been met by these third parties. 64 So the ques-
tion arises whether the plaintiff or defendant must establish a prima facie
case against each person or entity to whom he or she wishes liability to be
apportioned under Proposition 5 1.
The primary argument in favor of requiring that the plaintiff or defen-
dant present evidence satisfying all of the elements of the offense is that it
seems the most just system. American jurisprudence is based on the premise
that one is innocent until proven guilty. While this axiom is typically in-
voked in reference to the criminal system, the same general principle applies
to the civil system. Proof of this lies in the existence of the demurrer. If the
plaintiff does not plead sufficient facts to satisfy the elements of the claim,
the case is terminated before it begins. Likewise, if during the course of a
trial, one party does not present evidence sufficient to at least raise a "genu-
63. See, e.g., Rashtian v. BRAC-BH, Inc., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992);
Miller v. Stouffer, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Srithong v. Total Investment
Co., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); and Wimberly v. Derby Cycle Corp., 65 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
64. Note that the application of Proposition 51 has not been limited to tort suits in negli-
gence-a percentage of liability may also be assigned to an intentional tortfeasor or a strictly
liable defendant. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1431.1 (West 1986). However, for purposes of this
argument, the basis for liability is irrelevant because what is being argued is that the elements
of the offense must be proven.
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ine issue as to any material fact"65 on every element, the other party will be
granted a summary judgment. A person is not to be held directly liable for
damages unless there has a been a prima facie showing of proof of his or her
liability; so why make an exception where the person is not a party to the
trial and only indirectly apportioned a percentage of fault?
An argument against extending this degree of evidentiary formality to
Proposition 51 allocations is that it will increase the duration of each suit and
the burden on the parties and the court. However, only a subset of cases have
cause to employ the Proposition 51 statutes. And, only a fraction of those
will include non-parties in the determination of percentages of liability.
While it may increase the length of the trial in those rare cases, it is arguably
only returning them to their proper duration. The law encourages the settling
of all claims relating to a single dispute in a single trial.66 Thus, cases where
all potential defendants were not joined may already be aberrations not fa-
vored by public policy. Therefore, it would be in accordance with law and
public policy to at least fully litigate all of the issues and liabilities (even
those related to non-parties) in one suit.67
Should the standard be changed to require a prima facie showing of neg-
ligence by all third parties to whom a percentage of liability will be appor-
tioned, it would be necessary to figure out the mechanics of doing so.
Whereas in most trials each party is present to promote or defend its own in-
terests, this scenario would require parties to advocate on behalf of absent
non-parties. In most cases, the defendant(s) would be in the position of want-
ing to raise the issue of the fault of non-parties in an effort to offset its own
liability. In doing so, it would likely not be an overwhelming burden to re-
quire that the defendant plead facts sufficient to make out a prima facie case
of negligence against each third party.
The next step is where things get a bit complicated. If the defendant
pleaded facts sufficient to raise the issue of the negligence of third parties,
the plaintiff is placed in the position of defending those non-parties. This is
because it is in the plaintiff's interest to prevent liability attaching to non-
parties, thereby preventing a decrease in the percentage of liability attributed
to the named defendant. Plaintiffs in this position may be at a disadvantage
because they do not have direct and immediate access to a non-party's re-
cords, employees, premises, and so forth. On the other hand, this may not be
entirely unfair since the plaintiff was perhaps in a position to have included
this non-party in the trial in the first place. And, since the third party is not
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
66. The courts do not typically allow re-litigation over the same claim under the doctrine
of res judicata/claim preclusion or the same issue under the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel/issue preclusion, even if those issues come up within the context of a different claim. See
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.1 (3d ed. 1999).
67. This raises issues of defendants being present to defend their interests and raise all
defenses. H Prop. 51 essentially ignores this also.
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actually being held liable to pay any amount attributed to it by the jury, there
is no appreciable injustice suffered by the third party.
It also bears evaluation whether increasing the burden of evidentiary
proof would frustrate the plain language or intent of Proposition 5 1. The Act
clearly states that it was intended to rectify inequities and injustices.68 So on
its face, it would seem that the legislature was concerned above all with en-
suring justice, which as argued above, a prima facie evidentiary burden
would accomplish. Further reading of the Act reveals the intent that each de-
fendant shall be severally liable only for the damages proportionate to his or
her degree of fault. 69 The percentage of fault cannot be ascertained without
comparison to all other tortfeasors. And, under the increased evidentiary
burden prescribed above, a party or non-party cannot be at fault, or a tortfea-
sor, until the burden of proof has been met. Thus, the Act can still be applied
as intended if the courts require a prima facie showing of fault for each per-
son allocated a portion of the liability. Furthermore, it retains its intended
function of protecting deep pocket defendants from paying more than their
share. What it would no longer allow is for deep pocket defendants to escape
from payment of their full share by sloughing off liability onto unnamed
third parties and/or named non-parties whose liability has not been conclu-
sively established.
IV. SPECIAL PROBLEM OF IMMUNITY
Statutory immunity throws a monkey wrench into the neat little package
prescribed above. Under normal circumstances, any party hoping to decrease
his or her percentage of liability can present evidence of the fault of third
parties at trial. Given that he or she provides a prima facie showing of negli-
gence, we call this "fair." However, if the third party is immune, evidence of
his or her fault is specifically excluded from trial. This presents a dilemma
for the court and a significant roadblock for the party defendant(s).
The party defendant obviously would want to admit evidence of the
immune entity's fault in order to offset its own. However, if no fault can be
admitted, then the immune entity may not be considered a tortfeasor, and
thus, not be apportioned a percentage of fault."° The result of this is that the
party defendant pays the share of the entity that is protected, for some policy
reason, by an immunity statute. Various courts have found this to be an un-
fair result, and have, therefore, allowed an allocation of fault to the immune
entity in order to offset the defendant's percentage of damages. But again,
this brings us right back to the scenario where the plaintiff is completely
barred from fully recovering.
68. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.1(a) (West 1986).
69. Id. § 1431.2(a).
70. Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 928 P.2d 1181, 1192 (Cal. 1997).
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The two most recent and prominent California Supreme Court cases to
have addressed this issue are DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. 7I and Richards v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc.72 In DaFonte, a ranch worker's arm was mangled when
it was sucked into the grape harvester he was cleaning.73 Though the
worker's employer paid him workers compensation benefits, the employee
also filed suit against the manufacturer, Up-Right, on theories of negligence
and product defect.74 This suit was joined with the insurer's subrogation ac-
tion against the manufacturer.75
The trial court allocated forty percent of the fault to Up-Right, forty-five
percent to the employer, and fifteen percent to the plaintiff.76 However, pur-
suant to Proposition 51, it reduced the judgment against Up-Right by an
amount equal to the forty-five percent of non-economic damages attributable
to the employer.77 The appellate court disagreed with this Proposition 51 al-
location, which precluded recovery of full joint and several non-economic
damages against Up-Right, and reversed.78
On appeal to the California Supreme Court, the manufacturer chal-
lenged the appellate court's allocation of damages.79 The primary issue was
whether Up-Right's percentage of damages should be offset by that of the
employer, even though the employer was statutorily immune under worker's
compensation laws.8" The court held that because the plain language of the
statute did not include an explicit exception for employers immune under
worker's compensation programs, the court should not read one into the
statute.81 It read Proposition 51 to require that each defendant's fault must be
weighed against the fault of all others, whether party to the suit or not.82 As
such, the court said that the employer could still be considered at fault.83 The
primary rationale for the worker's compensation scheme was to provide an
alternative compensation system, not to establish as a matter of law and eth-
ics that employers should not be considered tortfeasors.84 It focused on the
71. 828 P.2d 140 (1992).
72. 928 P.2d 1181 (1997).
73. DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140, 141 (Cal. 1992).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 142. (This amount was not recoverable from the employer because it was statu-
torily immune under the worker's compensation statute.). See id. at 143.
78. See id. at 142.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 145.
82. See id. at 146.
83. See id. at 147.
84. Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 928 P.2d 1181, 1189 (Cal. 1997) (discussing Up-
Right, Inc., 828 P.2d at 143).
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intent of the Proposition, to protect "deep pocket defendants" from paying
one cent more than their share, as the overriding principle to be protected.8 5
Richards declined to follow DaFonte, finding that there was a funda-
mental difference in the type of immunity afforded by the worker's compen-
sation system and that provided to tobacco manufacturers.86 Here, a shipyard
worker sued various asbestos manufacturers in negligence and strict liability
for causing damage to his lungs.87 The trial court granted him a large award
of non-economic damages, which Owens-Illinois alone challenged on ap-
peal.88 The asbestos manufacturers contended that because Richards was a
long-time smoker, and smoking has been shown to damage lung function, a
significant portion of the liability should be attributed to tobacco companies
by way of Proposition 51.89
The court rejected this claim on the basis that liability under Proposition
51 could only be assigned to "tortfeasors."9 In 1988, the legislature declared
that tobacco manufacturers could not be held strictly liable for injuries
caused by normal use of their product because tobacco "is known to be un-
safe by the ordinary consumer." Therefore, the court interpreted the statute
to imply that manufacturers breached no duty in supplying tobacco products
to voluntary consumers.91 If the manufacturers had not breached a duty, they
could not be held to be at fault, and were not tortfeasors. 92 This was the ra-
tionale for providing immunity to makers of "inherently unsafe" products. 93
Thus, the Richards court viewed it as "anomalous if, though immunized on
such grounds from direct liability for providing an 'inherently unsafe' prod-
uct to a knowing and voluntary consumer, the supplier could nonetheless be
assigned 'fault' for doing so in an action between that same consumer and a
third party defendant." 94
Extrapolation of the Richards holding would seem to provide that the
implication of statutory immunity is usually the negation of duty. 95 Since the
immune entity has no duty, it, by definition, cannot be held liable for a tort
or, at least, the tort of negligence. A prima facie case of negligence cannot be
made out without proving a duty and breach thereof. Thus, an immune party
cannot be found to be a "tortfeasor" and, consummately held liable either di-
rectly or indirectly.
85. Up-Right, Inc.828 P.2d at 146.
86. Richards, 928 P.2d at 1189.
87. Id. at 1183.
88. Id. at 1184.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1183.
91. Richards, 928 P.2d at 1191.
92. Id. at 1189 n.6.
93. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45 (West 1988).
94. Richard., 928 P.2d at 1191.
95. The court said that the tobacco manufacturers did not breach a duty. Id If they caused
harm, but did not breach a duty, it would seem to follow that they had no duty in the first
place.
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Stemming from this analysis, it also appears that the Richards holding
requires that a prima facie case be made out against any entity to whom li-
ability is to be apportioned. While immunity statutes may legislatively re-
move one of the elements of the tort from consideration, it would seem rea-
sonable that lack of proof could likewise do so. Direct liability may not be
ascribed to a party without a sufficient evidentiary basis; so why should an
indirect apportionment be allowed to circumvent this rule?
It will be interesting to see how the courts approach similar cases based
upon other grants of statutory immunity. For instance, California Business
and Professions Code § 2395 provides immunity to licensed medical profes-
sionals for civil damages incurred while providing medical care at the scene
of an emergency. 96 The policy basis for this statute is to encourage doctors to
provide emergency medical treatment to those obviously in need of it where
they otherwise would have no duty to do so.97 Because the emphasis of this
statute is the lack of duty, it would seem that the Richard's logic would ap-
ply.
The logic here requires an additional step. Normally, physicians would
have no duty to aid. However, should they voluntarily begin treatment and
cause some sort of further injury in the process, they could normally be held
liable for the injury. In an effort to prevent this fear of liability from deter-
ring doctors from providing medical services, the statute explicitly absolves
them of this liability. Thus, in essence, the statute holds that medical provid-
ers cannot breach the duty that may arise from a gratuitous undertaking.98
Therefore, all of the elements of a prima facie case of negligence could not
be proven in order to make a Proposition 51 apportionment.
V. CONCLUSION
As drafted, Proposition 51 added a measure of fairness to the tort com-
pensation system. However, the courts have seemingly extended the doctrine
far beyond what the voters intended and policy standards have long required.
The firmly entrenched notion of joint and several liability reflects the belief
that it is of paramount concern to protect an innocent, injured party's right to
fully recover. Consistent with this principle, it is reasonable to hold that,
where there are multiple tortfeasors present in the action, each should only
have to pay its share of the damages. However, it is not consistent with joint
96. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2395 (West 1990).
97. 36 CAL. JUR. 3D HEALING ARTS AND INSTITUTIONS § 285 (West 1997).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 324 (1965).
One who, being under no duty to do so, takes charge of another who is helpless
adequately to aid or protect himself is subject to liability to the other for any bodily
harm caused to him by (a) the failure of the actor to exercise reasonable care to se-
cure the safety of the other while within the actor's charge, or (b) the actor's dis-
continuing his aid or protection, if by so doing he leaves the other in a worse posi-
tion than when the actor took charge of him.
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and several liability principles to decrease the plaintiffs recovery by appor-
tioning part of the liability to non-present, insolvent, missing or immune par-
ties from whom the plaintiff has no chance of recovering.
In order to prevent this latter eventuality, it would seem logical to limit
the scope of Proposition 51 to what were likely its intended boundaries.
Namely, liability may only be attributed to parties or non-parties who are
named and where a prima facie showing of their degree of fault has been
made. This would protect the plaintiff s right to recover and give the plaintiff
the incentive to include all parties to the suit so that he or she would not risk
being barred by preclusion doctrines from collecting from third parties to
whom fault had been apportioned. It would also protect "deep pocket defen-
dants" from paying more than their fair share. Moreover, because a prima
facie case could almost never be made out against immune entities, defen-
dants would be barred from attempting to offload some of the liability onto
these entities.
The courts are presently in a position where it would not be impossible
to retrace their steps and limit the application of Proposition 51 as suggested
in this Comment. The California Supreme Court has not directly addressed
the issue of the required evidentiary standard for third-party defendants
against whom liability is to be assessed under Proposition 51. Likewise, the
Richards holding represents movement in the right direction in that it does
not include immune entities in the allocation of liability.
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